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PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA DURING
THE POST-BROWN DECADE

I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Davison Douglas recently painted a perceptive portrait of how several southern states, most notably North Carolina, were able to minimize integration of their public primary
and secondary schools during the decade after the Supreme
Court issued Brown v. Board of Education. 1 Professor Douglas
found that these jurisdictions, by practicing token integration
and casting their rhetoric in comparatively conciliatory tones,
managed to appear moderate on the issue of school desegregation. 2 This approach enabled the states to limit judicial scrutiny
of their public educational systems and to experience somewhat
less integration than their southern neighbors, such as Georgia,
South Carolina, and Virginia, which opposed integration more
adamantly.3 The jurisdictions that seemed restrained also realized greater economic growth by creating perceptions of a
climate conducive to business and of a society that enjoyed relatively harmonious racial relations. 4
Professor Douglas ascertained that, ten years after Brown,
North Carolina's public schools were less integrated than those
of more defiant southern states,5 while North Carolina had

* Professor of Law, University of Montana; B.A., 1968, Duke University; LL.B.,
1972, University of Virginia. I wish to thank Davison Douglas, Jon Entin, Michael
Mayer, Richard McAdams, Peggy Sanner, Rod Smith, and Gail Stafford for valuable
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and
the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation:
Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92
(1994).
2. See Douglas, supra note 1, at 94-97.
3. See id. at 93-97.
4. See id. at 96-97.
5. See id. at 139; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 9-10 (1994); accord DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READ-
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maintained a reputation for moderation on racial issues and was
reaping the image's advantages in terms of enhanced economic
development. 6 Professor Douglas concluded that this "result
could not have been surprising" in a region ''historically beset
with profound ironies when it came to matters of race.m
Between 1953 and 1964, I attended public schools in Virginia,
a state that Professor Douglas accurately characterizes as more
recalcitrant than North Carolina. 8 I, therefore, want to afford
some personal recollections of this critical decade in national
history and to compare important legal, political, and social
developments involving integration in the Old Dominion with
Professor Douglas's valuable account.
Public education deserves emphasis for several reasons. Both
practically and symbolically, schools proved to be the public
institutions whose desegregation was most controversial. Moreover, the efforts to integrate public education trenchantly illustrate the inherent limitations of essentially legal approaches to
issues as intractable as racial discrimination. I shall also examine briefly additional public facilities, principally swimming
areas, and libraries, and certain private facilities, such as restaurants and bus stations, that were open to the public. 9
I focus on Petersburg, Virginia, because I attended school
there and because it is situated in Southside Virginia, an area of
the Commonwealth that lies between the James River and
North Carolina and between the City of Chesapeake and the

ING, WRITING & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS 49 (1995).
6. Douglas, supra note 1, at 139.
7. Id. See generally VALDIMER 0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION
(1949) (providing an overview of southern political systems); C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY (rev. ed. 1968) (discussing the relationship between southern history and contemporary events in the South).
8. Douglas, supra note 1, at 93-94.
9. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 58-61 (analyzing public and private facilities);
Carl Tobias, Untenable, Unchristian and Unconstitutional, 58 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1993)
(analyzing libraries); see also Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1136-37 (1995) (affording citations to Supreme
Court public facilities opinions); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and
Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV.
485, 505 (1978) (same). See generally Robert B. McKay, Segregation and Public Recreation, 40 VA. L. REV. 697 (1954) (examining the integration of public recreational
facilities).
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Blue Ridge Mountains. Southside constituted the Old
Dominion's "black belt"-a contiguous band of counties with the
heaviest concentrations of blacks, named for its substantial
black population and its "dark, rich soil that once supported the
plantation aristocracy and its slaves."10 Indeed, blacks comprised almost half of Petersburg's approximately 40,000 residents at the time of the events that I recount. Southside resembles the deep South, and the region led Virginia's battle against
the integration of public education, preventing the desegregation
of every school in the Commonwealth for a half-decade.
Petersburg and Southside Virginia, by virtue of their location
and history, were also unreconstructed, particularly in contrast
to more metropolitan areas, such as Northern Virginia and
Hampton Roads, and even in comparison to Richmond, the capital of the Confederate States of America. It is important to remember that white residents of Petersburg, Southside Virginia,
and much of the South never have forgotten that Petersburg
was the site where the Confederacy made its final stand in the
''War of Northern Oppression" and that nearby Appomattox was
the infamous place where the Confederate States surrendered.
Issues of race have always been a fixture of daily existence for
all Southerners, both white and black. Nonetheless, I remember,
as a child in a middle-class white family that resided in a segregated neighborhood, that racial issues affected my day-to-day
activities infrequently, particularly in public school. We lived in
the suburb of Walnut Hill, which, like almost every one of
Petersburg's neighborhoods, was segregated. The deeds to most
10. Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496; see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR. 133 (1994) (discussing the disproportionately high black population in
Southside); RoBERT A. PRATT, THE COLOR OF THEm SKIN: EDUCATION AND RACE IN
RICHMOND, VmGINIA 1954-1989, at 4 (1992) (describing black-belt political districts);
PARK RoUSE, JR., BELOW THE JAMES LIES DIXIE (1968) (detailing the history of
Southside, Virginia); Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": A Study of
School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 994 (1956) (defining the "South"). I
employ the term "black" in referring to African Americans in part because the author of the piece to which I am responding does. Judicial opinions and commentary
that were contemporaneous with Brown frequently employed the terms "Negro" and
even "colored." See, e.g., Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 432 (E.D. Va.),
affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Harrison v. Day, 106
S.E.2d 636, 640 (Va. 1959); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY
202-03 n.1 (1994) (discussing why she chooses to use the term "black").
·
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of Walnut Hill's lots included restrictive covenants, analogous to
those invalidated by the Supreme Court in Shelley v.
Kraemer, 11 that precluded property transfers to persons of African descent. 12
Housing patterns were racially stratified in the city and in the
surrounding counties of Dinwiddie and Prince George. Practically all of the whites who lived in "integrated" neighborhoods
resided there because they could not afford to live elsewhere. My
parents, like many middle-income whites, hired a black woman
to help manage the household by cooking, cleaning, and caring
for the children; however, my daily interactions with her rarely
raised what I perceived to be issues of race.
In January 1953, I began attending Walnut Hill Elementary
School, a brand new, sprawling brick building that was surrounded by grassy playing fields and to which most students
could ride their bicycles. The city had constructed the educational facility so that pupils could learn at a modern structure and
suburban parents would not have to transport their children to
and from D.M. Brown Elementary School. D.M. Brown, the deteriorating, obsolete edifice that most of the parents had attended,
was located in a rather seedy, concrete and steel part of downtown Petersburg.
Students at Walnut Hill Elementary were the consummate
Baby Boomers. We were principally the children of war brides
and their husbands, who had successfully fought World War II
and wanted to recapture time that they had lost in waging the
conflict. The primary school served the Walnut Hill district-a
large neighborhood that, by legal construct, did not include
blacks. All of the teachers and students at the school were
white. Moreover, Walnut Hill Elementary remained segregated

11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
12. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 14 (discussing restrictive covenants); Louis
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473
(1962) (analyzing Shelley). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688-89, 1711-14 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Shelley and state action theory); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: 'l'HURGOOD MARsHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 81-98 (1994) (discussing attacks on restrictive covenants); CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP,
AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959) (same).
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from 1953 until I graduated from Petersburg High School in
1964.
In my early years, Walnut Hill Elementary was the locus of
an incident implicating race that remains indelibly imprinted on
my memory. 13 .On the afternoon of May 17, 1954, the day that
the Supreme Court issued Brown, my mother and I were driving
past the school on a shopping trip. I was looking at the Petersburg Progress-Index, the afternoon newspaper that served our
community. I asked my mother, a Pennsylvania native, what the
one-inch high banner headline meant. She explained that the
United States Supreme Court had struck down the "separatebut-equal" doctrine, thereby requiring public schools to integrate. I responded that I did not want to attend school with
"niggers,'' and my mother administered the worst tongue lashing
that I had experienced during my seven short years. Little did I
know then that the Virginia General Assembly, principally by
pursuing ''Massive .Resistance,'n4 and the Petersburg School
Board, by devising additional ingenious means of evading integration, would enable me to realize my uninformed, childish
wish. How the state and local powers managed to preserve essentially segregated public schools for a decade with a degree of
success nearly equal to North Carolina's is the story that I wish
to relate.
II. PuBLIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION

Initial reactions to the Supreme Court's issuance of Brown
varied significantly across the South. 15 The political leaders of

13. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Carl Tobias, Correspondence, 10
CONST. COMMENTARY 283 (1993).
14. See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MAsSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE
AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969) (describing the use of "massive resistance" in the South).
15. See Douglas, supra note 1, at 98-100; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 6-24
(analyzing developments that led to Brown); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (same); Garrett
Epps, The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick and the Second Civil War, 10 CONST.
COMMENTARY 19 (1993) (describing initial reactions). See generally RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975) (detailing the history surrounding the
Brown decision); RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF
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several states promptly and stridently denounced the Court. 16
For instance, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi vilified the
Justices for perpetrating a "monstrous crime" in the "false name
of law and justice." 17 Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia
implacably proclaimed that the Court had reduced the Constitution to a "mere scrap of paper'' and promised that the state
would never integrate its schools during his tenure. 18 Indeed,
Georgia and South Carolina anticipated Brown by abrogating
constitutional requirements that the jurisdictions provide public
education. 19
A. Virginia
More measured, immediate responses emanated from much of
the South, including states such as Virginia, which would eventually formulate and spearhead the strategy of Massive Resistance. Thomas Stanley, the Governor of the Old Dominion,
pledged to devise a program that the Commonwealth's residents
would find acceptable and that would honor the Court's edict. 20
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., the state's attorney general, similarly
asserted that the Old Dominion would take a realistic approach
to Brown and would attempt ,to make "some rational adjustment"21; however, Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Sr., intransigently
decried the Court for usurping states' rights and predicted that
the opinion would precipitate a "crisis of the first magnitude."22
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984) (detailing desegregation efforts).
16. Douglas, supra note 1, at 98.
17. DAVID R. GoLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN: RACE RELATIONS AND
SOUTHERN CULTURE, 1940 TO THE PRESENT 75 (1990); see also REED SARRATT, THE
ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION: THE FIRST DECADE 1 (1966) (reproducing a similarly
defiant statement of Mississippi's governor).
18. Constitution Ruined, Says Georgia Governor, DURHAM MORNING HERALD, May
18, 1954, at 1. But cf. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 27-29 (documenting North Carolina
Governor William Umstead's moderate response to Brown).
19. See BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF INTEGRATION
SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION 21 (1964). See generally McKay, supra
note 10, at 1041-43 (discussing efforts by southern states to abrogate compulsory
public education).
20. See MUSE, supra note 19, at 21 (describing pledges made); see also CHARLES
P. ROLAND, THE IMPROBABLE ERA: THE SOUTH SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 35 (1975)
(detailing reactions to Brown).
21. PRATT, supra note 10, at 99.
22. Id. at 1-2 (quoting Byrd); Douglas, supra note 1, at 99 (quoting Almond). See
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The mild initial reaction to Brown in much of the South rapidly gave way to vociferous opposition as political leaders quickly
came to appreciate the political popularity among white voters of
a strong stance against integration.23 A mere five weeks after
Brown's issuance, Governor Stanley defiantly announced that he
would employ all legal means at his disposal to maintain segregated public education, while twenty Southside Virginia legislators convened in Petersburg under state Senator Garland Gray's
leadership and declared themselves "unalterably opposed" to
school integration. 24
On August 30, 1954, the Governor appointed a commission
comprised of thirty-two white members of the General Assembly
to analyze Brown's effects and to make suggestions. 25 While the
Gray Commission was undertaking its study and developing
recommendations, the Supreme Court issued a second opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown ll), 26 which required
school desegregation to begin at once and to proceed ''with all
deliberate speed."27
Brown II was controversial in 1955 and has remained so.28
Some observers have asserted that the second Brown decision
generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, HARRY BYRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF VmGINIA POLITICS, 1945-1966 (1968) (describing Byrd's political organization).
·
23. Douglas, supra note 1, at 99.
24. PRATI', supra note 10, at 3-4 (discussing the Petersburg meeting); Virginia, S.
SCH. NEWS, Sept. 3, 1954, at 13 (quoting Stanley). .
25. See Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Va.), affd, 246 F.2d
325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at
20 (discussing a similar North Carolina commission that included blacks); ROBBINS
L. GATES, THE MAKING OF MAsSIVE RESISTANCE 34-36 (1964) (discussing the first
Commission meeting at which Senator Gray was elected Chair).
26. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
27. Id. at 300-01.
28. Several commentators have chronicled this proposition. See, e.g., ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 68-72, 250-54 (1962); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 22-31 (1970); Robert
A. Burt, Brown's Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483, 1483-84 (1994); Robert L. Carter,
The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 243-46 (1969); Klarman,
supra note 5, at 10-11; Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": Legislatiue
Reaction and Judicial Deuelopment 1956-57, 43 VA. L. REV. 1205, 1205-07 (1957);
Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (1991).
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undercut the power and moral authority of the :first. 29 Numerous states in the South seized upon Brown II to evade Brown's
mandate or treated Brown II as a signal that the Court would
not rigorously enforce Brown. 30 Indeed, during the ensuing decade, the Court effectively departed the school integration field
and left Brown's implementation to southern circuit and district
court judges while affording them little guidance.31 Cooper v.
Aaron32 was the only major opinion involving desegregation
that the Court issued between 1955 and 1963, and the controversy surrounding the integration of the Little Rock schools
probably necessitated the Court's decision in that case. 33
In November 1955, Virginia's Gray Commission issued a report that expressed the view that separate public schools were
in the best interest of both races. 34 The Commission also proposed that the General Assembly pass a pupil placement statute
vesting total authority in local school boards to assign pupils in
ways that would most effectively promote the welfare of the
localities and their schools. 35 The Gray Commission recom-

29. See, e.g., Black, supra note 28, at 22-31; Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's
Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946·1960: An Oral History,
100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827-28 (1987); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 503-05.
30. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 490-92.
31. See Black, supra note 28, at 22-31; Carter, supra note 28, at 243-46;
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 505-06, 512-13, 541. See generally JACK W. PELTASON,
FIFI'Y-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
(1961) (surveying the responsP.s of federal courts after Brown).
32. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
33. See id. "The Court spoke mainly when it absolutely had to: at the point of
crisis when obstruction was so apparent, delay so prolonged, or violation of constitutional principle so manifest that quiet was no longer feasible." Wilkinson, supra note
9, at 506 (citations omitted); see DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 46-48, 126-27; Sanford J.
Rosen, Judge Sobeloffs Public School Race Decisions, 34 MD. L. REV. 498, 502-03
(1974). See generally DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK (1962) (giving a participant's perspective on the Little Rock crisis); TONY FREYER, 'l'HE LITTLE
RoCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1984) (detailing the crisis).
34. Report of Commission on Public Education, reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP.
241 (1955) [hereinafter Gray Commission Report); see Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F.
Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Va.), affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855
(1957). See generally PRATT, supra note 10, at 4-5 (providing a history of the Gray
Commission and its findings).
35. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 434; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 29-32
(asserting that the North Carolina commission recommended a sinillar plan of local
control). See generally Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools:
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mended as well that no child be required to attend integrated
schools and that the state supply tuition grants to parents who
objected to integration or who lived in areas without public
schools.as
During spring 1956, Senator Byrd coined the term "Massive
Resistance," and ninety percent of the congressional delegation
from the South signed a "Southern Manifesto,'' castigating
Brown as a "clear abuse of judicial power'' and vowing to reverse
it.a7 During the same time period, the Virginia General Assembly and a majority of the states that comprised the old Confederacy adopted "interposition" resolutions.as The Virginia resolution announced the Assembly's "firm intention to take all ·appropriate measures honorably, legally and constitutionally available ... [in order] to resist [Brown's] illegal encroachment upon
[Virginia's] sovereign powers" through judicial legislation.a9
In late August 1956, Governor Stanley addressed a special
session of the Assembly that convened to consider issues involving education. 40 After proclaiming that the Old Dominion faced

Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1450-51
(1962) (giving a brief history of judicial reaction to the "massive resistance" policies
of southern states). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 22-232.1 (Michie Supp. 1962) (divesting
local school boards of pupil placement power and vesting the power in local "Pupil
Placement Boards").
36. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 434; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 32-34
(asserting that the first North Carolina commission rejected, but second commission
endorsed, tuition grant and school-dosing proposals but noting that North Carolina
never actually closed schools or paid grants). See generally GATES, supra note 25, at
62-65 (providing historical background of tuition vouchers in Virginia); MUSE, supra
note 19, at 148 (same).
37. See JAMES W. ELY, THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VmGINIA 43 (1976) (discussing the Southern Manifesto); GATES, supra note 25, at 118 (noting that the Southern
Manifesto "bore the names of nineteen senators and eighty-two representatives");
MUSE, supra note 19, at 147 (discussing Byrd's coining of "Mas~ive Resistance");
PRATI', supra note 10, at 6 (same). See generally BARTLEY, supra note 14, at 116-17
(discussing the origin of the Southern Manifesto and Massive Resistance).
38. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia adopted
resolutions. See Douglas, supra note 1, at 93; see also Epps, supra note 15, at 22-25
(giving a general history of interposition).
39. S.J. Res. 3, 1956 Va. Acts 1213. See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 3639 (providing information about the Gray Plan and the doctrine of "interposition");
PRATI', supra note 10, at 5-7 (same); McKay, supra note 10, at 1017-39 (giving a
thorough historical analysis of "interposition" and its origins).
40. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 435.
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the "gravest problems since 1865" and that Brown struck at the
"very fundamentals of constitutional government," the governor
submitted "recommendations to continue [Virginia's] system of
segregated public schools."41
During late September, the Extra Session of the Assembly
passed a series of laws addressing desegregation that Professor
Robert McKay of the New York University School of Law contemporaneously described as the "most intricate school legislation of all."42 The General Assembly found that the "mixing of
white and colored children in any elementary or secondary public school ... constitute[d] a clear and present danger affecting
and endangering the health and welfare of the children and
citizens."43
The legislature enacted measures that prohibited racially
integrated schools from receiving any state appropriations while
prescribing tuition vouchers for students whose public schools
closed because they integrated. 44 The Assembly then proceeded
to pass a pupil placement statute that placed authority in a
specially constituted state board, thus rejecting the Gray
Commission's recommendation that it vest complete power in
local school boards.45 In doing so, the Assembly enumerated
several criteria relating to school administration, educational
policy, and student health, welfare, and safety, that the board
was required to consider in assigning pupils to schools. 46 Per41. Id. See generally GATES, supra note 25, at 167-90 (giving a detailed voting
history of the Stanley plan).
42. McKay, supra note 28, at 1225; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-5 to 253.2
(Michie Supp. 1956) (providing Virginia legislation); cf. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 33
(asserting that North Carolina adopted less legislation than did other southern
states).
43. Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 437.
44. See id. at 436-42; see also Gray Commission Report, supra note 34, at 242
(proposing tuition vouchers). For a discussion of tuition vouchers, see JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 135 (noting that a referendum to allow a voucher plan passed by a
two-to-one margin); McKay, supra note 10, at 1043-49.
45. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 436-42; see also PRATI', supra note 10, at 19 (suggesting that the Assembly was concerned that "some school boards might not voluntarily accept massive resistance"). See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 36 (stating that control was removed from localities to avoid voluntary integration); McKay,
supra note 10, at 1049-53 (discussing the North Carolina plan).
46. Pupil Placement Act, 1956 Va. Acts, Extra Sess., ch. 70, § 3(1), (8); see
Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 441-42 (listing the various factors). See generally Note, su-
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haps the most important factors were those respecting "efficient"
operation of schools, which, by definition, proscribed the assignment of whites and blacks to the same educational facility. 47
The Assembly enacted this legislation after black plaintiffs
had instituted litigation in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in an effort to enjoin the continuation of segregated public education in Norfolk and Newport
News. 48 Both local jurisdictions defended the statutory scheme
by requesting that Judge Walter Hoffman, an Eisenhower appointee, dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 49
In Adkins v. School Board, 50 Judge Hoffman extensively reviewed the legislative developments that had transpired in the
Old Dominion since Brown and considered the placement statute
together with the remaining measures. 51 The court found the
placement legislation to be unconstitutional on its face. 52 The
judge concluded that the enactment precluded the assignment
entity from authorizing any desegregation, as this action would
automatically terminate state appropriations, and ascertained
that the legislation's definition of "efficient" mandated consideration of race in making pupil assignments.53 Finding the pattern of legislation clearly unconstitutional, the court flatly refused to require that the plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies because those remedies were cumbersome and fruitless. 54
pra note 35, at 1449-59 (giving the history of several pupil placement statutes).
47. Pupil Placement Act, § 3(1), (8); see Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 441-42. For discussion of anti-NAACP measures that the Assembly included in the legislative package, see PRATI', supra note 10, at 8-9; Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks:
The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL. Q. 371 (1959). See also TUSHNET, supra note 12,
at 272-300 (analyzing cases challenging the anti-NAACP legislation); F.D.G. Ribble,
Constitutional Law, 44 VA. L. REV. 1350, 1352-57 (1958) (same).
48. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 432.
49. See id. at 432-33. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1459-65 (discussing
the doctrine of exhaustion as it related to the pupil placement legislation).
50. 148 F. Supp. 430; see also McKay, supra note 28, at 1225-26 (affording helpful
analysis of Adkins); Daniel J. Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils
to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REV. 517, 539-41 (1959) (same); F.D.G. Ribble, Constitutional Law, 45 VA. L. REV. 1402, 1407-08 (1959) (same).
51. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 434-42.
52. See id. at 436.
53. See id. at 438-42.
54. See id. at 442-45. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1461-63 (explaining
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Professor McKay observed contemporaneously that the "most
carefully planned of all the state proposals, and the most sophisticated in the nuances of the law, ha[d] proved also in a sense
the most naive."55
Six months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court in a per curiam opinion.56 The appellate court rejected the exhaustion argument
because it believed that the state placement statute afforded
plaintiffs no adequate remedy. 57 The panel observed that the
district court's decree required neither that children be assigned
to particular schools nor that they be assigned to racially integrated public schools. 58 In discussing this decree, the court added that the two Brown decisions "do not compel the mixing of
the different races in the public schools."59 On October 21,
1957, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 60
During November 1957, J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., who had been
the Old Dominion's attorney general and who had argued Brown
II for Virginia, was elected Governor. In Governor Almond's
January 1958 Inaugural Address, he proclaimed that desegregation of the public schools would not be allowed in Virginia. 61
During 1958, the Alexandria, Charlottesville, Norfolk, and

the concept of futility as it related to placement acts).
55. McKay, supra note 28, at 1226.
56. See School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855
(1957). The Federal Reporter changed the spelling of the named plaintiff to Atkins
from Adkins. Compare id. with Adkins, 148 F. Supp. 430.
57. See Atkins, 246 F.2d at 326-27. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1460-61
(discussing common reasons for not applying the exhaustion doctrine).
58. Atkins, 246 F.2d at 327.
59. Id. (quoting School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 910 (1957)). Chief Judge John J. Parker employed similar language in two
earlier cases that significantly slowed integration's pace in the Fourth Circuit. See
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 9.10
(1957) (holding that plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies); Briggs v.
Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (stating that Brown "has not decided
that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools"); see also
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 507-08 (explaining Judge Parker's interpretation of
Brown).
60. School Bd. v. Atkins, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
61. See James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 334 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 359 U.S. 1006 (1959). See generally PRATI, supra note 10, at 9 (describing Almond's political platform).
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Arlington County school boards promulgated local pupil placement plans. 62 The boards adopted these local measures in part
so that they would have formal procedures and criteria, as the
state placement act had proved ineffective, and in part as a
response to the judicial decision invalidating the state placement
legislation. 63
In May 1958, the plaintiffs pursuing the Norfolk school desegregation litigation, black schoolchildren seeking admission to
schools previously attended exclusively by whites, sought additional relief from Judge Hoffman.64 The court denied their petition because the plaintiffs had not requested transfers from the
school board. 65 By July 25th, the board's deadline for receipt of
applications, 151 blacks had applied.66 On August 18, the Board
denied every request, articulating four reasons: (1) the assignment of a few blacks among many white students would foster a
harmful "sense of isolation," (2) the "peculiar circumstances
would involve 'racial conflicts and grave administrative problems,'" (3) numerous applicants were scholastically ineligible to
transfer, and (4) some black pupils who were qualified would
have to transfer again in 1959, and that would not be "conducive
to proper education." 67
Judge Hoffman invited the school board members to attend
court on August 25th.68 The judge sustained the board's reasoning in rejecting the applications of students in the third and
fourth categories, but he explained that potential isolation and
racial tensions were legally deficient and asked the board mem-

62. See Meador, supra note 50, at 530. See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 2225 (discussing the implementation of pupil placement boards).
63. See Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 445-46 (E.D. Va.) (invalidating
state placement legislation), affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855
(1957).
64. See School Bd. v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958) (describing events leading to the affirmance of the district court's denial of Virginia's motion to delay integration by one year); James, 170 F. Supp. at 334; see also PRATI', supra note 10, at
10 (describing litigation that led to school closings in other Virginia localities);
Ribble, supra note 47, at 1350-52 (analyzing Virginia litigation).
65. Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19.
66. Id.
67. James, 170 F. Supp. at 334; accord Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19 (pro\'iding date of
denial).
68. Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19.
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bers to reconsider. 69 On August 29th, the school board reported
to the court that it would assign seventeen named plaintiffs who
were scholastically eligible to six secondary schools that only
whites had previously attended. 70 The board also sought to defer the black students' enrollment for a year. 71 Judge Hoffman
denied that request on September 2nd with leave to reconsider
in light of Cooper v. Aaron, 72 an important school desegregation
case that was before the Supreme Court. 73
The Court's issuance of its opinion in Cooper on September 12,
1958, led Judge Hoffman to file a memorandum on September
18th rejecting the school board's deferment request. 74 Five days
thereafter, the school board sought a stay from the Fourth Circuit, which denied that petition but offered to convene a special
session of the court in order to consider the appeal's merits. 75
On September 27th, the Fourth Circuit heard the appeal and
affirmed, signing an order that day and subsequently filing an
opinion. 76 Immediately after the court ruled, the board assigned
the seventeen black students to the six schools in controversy,
which previously were comprised solely of white students. 77 The
same day, Governor Almond invoked the authority of the schoolclosing law and issued a proclamation declaring that the six
schools were closed. 78
In response to Governor Almond's proclamation, several white
schoolchildren who would have been enrolled in those educational facilities and their parents promptly filed suit seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the enforcement,
operation, and execution of most of the measures that the General Assembly had passed during its 1956 Extra Session. 79 Par-

69. James, 170 F. Supp. at 334.
70. Id.; accord Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19-20.
71. Beckett, 260 F.2d at 20.
72. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
73. See Beckett, 260 F.2d at 20.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 18 (issuing opinion on October 2nd).
77. See James, 170 F. Supp. at 334.
78. See id. at 334-35 & n.3 (quoting the text of the governor's proclamation).
79. See id. at 333; see also supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (describing
the measures that the Extra Session had passed). See generally Ribble, supra note
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ents were concerned that the legislative package would deprive
their children of public education.80 Although these parents
probably preferred segregated schools to integrated ones, they
favored desegregated facilities to none at all. A three-judge
court, consisting of Fourth Circuit Judges Clement Haynsworth
and Simon Sobeloff and District Judge Hoffman, convened to
hear the suit because the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
against several state officials. 81 On January 19, 1959, the court
held that the school-closing statute was unconstitutional. 82
First, the three-judge panel exhaustively reviewed the history
of efforts by the state authorities and the local school board in
response to Brown. 83 The court then examined the condition of
public education in the city of Norfolk since Governor Almond
had ordered the six schools closed the preceding September. The
panel initially observed that the seventeen black students whom
the school board had assigned to facilities previously attended by
whites were "not in attendance at any school."84 The court next
considered the educational circumstances of the 10,000 white
children who would have enrolled at the closed facilities and
ascertained that nearly half of those pupils had received some
private tutoring but that more than a quarter had been deprived
of any education at all. 85 The court found that plaintiffs' counsel had appropriately characterized the plight of the students
and their teachers as "tragic."86
The three judges held that the closing of public schools violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Four-

47, at 1352-57 (describing six acts, relating to NAACP cases, passed by the Extra
Session).
80. See Ribble, supra note 47, at 1351.
81. See James, 170 F. Supp. at 333; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed
1976); id. § 2284 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (describing the requirements, composition,
and procedures for a three-judge court).
82. James, 170 F. Supp. at 337.
83. See id. at 333-35. See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 10 (describing the
closing of Virginia schools in 1958 under state massive resistance laws).
84. James, 170 F. Supp. at 335.
85. Id. at 335-36. See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 10 (describing the closing
of Virginia schools under the state massive resistance laws).
86. James, 170 F. Supp. at 336. See generally MUSE, supra note 19, at 111-13
(describing the tensions that ensued when black students were admitted to schools
in five southern cities that had previously been all-white).
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teenth Amendment. 87 The panel relied substantially on the recently issued opinion of the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron. 88 In Cooper, the Court declared that state support of segregated public education contravened the Equal Protection Clause
and proclaimed that students' rights "not to be segregated on
racial grounds in schools so maintained [were] so fundamental
and pervasive" as to encompass -due process. 89
On the same day that the three-judge panel invalidated the
state legislation, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an opinion
in Harrison v. Day, 90 holding that certain of those statutory
requirements violated several provisions of the Virginia Constitution that essentially prescribed the creation and maintenance
of free public schools in the Commonwealth. 91 The state court
evaluated the legislation's validity in the context of the Virginia
Comptroller's inquiry about the Old Dominion's reimbursement
of local school boards that paid tuition grants.92 The Virginia
Supreme Court also refused to consider whether the statutes
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Brown and Cooper.93 The state court gratuitously deplored the ''lack of judicial
restraint evinced by that court in trespassing on the sovereign

87. James, 170 F. Supp. at 336-37. See generally PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 11 (discussing the court's ruling in James and the governor's responses to it).
88. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also James, 170 F. Supp. at 337 (analyzing and applying Cooper).
89. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19. See generally FREYER, supra note 33 (describing the
city of Little Rock before Cooper, the Court's ruling, and its aftermath); PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 11 (discussing the Court's ruling in Cooper and the governor's response to it); TRIBE, supra note 12, at 33-36, 40-41 (discussing the Court's decision
in Cooper in relation to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)); Daniel
Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387 (discussing the constitutional history leading up to Cooper and
analyzing Cooper under the Supremacy Clause).
90. 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959).
91. See id. at 645-46; see also PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 11 (discussing the court's
ruling in Harrison); Ribble, supra note 50, at 1410-12 (discussing the opinions in
Harrison). The federal court apparently delayed the issuance of its ruling until the
Virginia Supreme Court had spoken on the same January 19th date, which was
General Robert E. Lee's birthday and a Virginia state holiday. Epps, supra note 15,
at 25.
92. Harrison, 106 S.E.2d at 639.
93. Id. at 647.
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rights of [the] Commonwealth" and remarked that the legislation represented an "understandable effort to diminish the evils
expected from the decision in the Brown case."94
Notwithstanding the somewhat unusual manner in which
Harrison arose, the court's invocation of the Virginia Constitution, and the court's unwarranted observations, this decision and
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in James v. Almond effectively undercut the Old Dominion's defiance. Professor Alexander Bickel
astutely commented that the ''hard judicial attitude [evidenced
in the two cases] achieved what had quite evidently been its
aim. It broke the back of massive resistance."95
When Governor Almond was forced to announce the public
schools' opening, he committed an act that many Virginians,
particularly in the Commonwealth's political establishment, considered to be an unpardonable sin for which they never forgave
him. The Virginia Industrialization Group, an entity comprised
of ninety state business leaders, apparently influenced the governor by persuading him, in December 1958, that Massive Resistance was impeding economic development substantially:96 "Almond gave one last never-say-die speech, then made a dramatic
about-face. On January 28, 1959, he spoke to the General Assembly and bowed to the inevitable. Five days thereafter, twenty-one black children entered formerly all-white schools in
Arlington and Norfolk. Massive resistance was over."97

94. Id.
95. Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193, 204 (1964); see also Epps, supra note 15, at 25 (describing the rise of the "Massive Resistance" era and the court's formal destruction
of it in James).
96. JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 151-53; see also GATES, supra note 25, at 96-99
(identifying four groups of Virginia leaders in terms of views on desegregation). See
generally JAMES C. COBB, THE SELLING OF THE SOUTH: THE SOUTHERN CRUSADE FOR
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1936-1980 (1982) (surveying the evolution of efforts to
encourage industrial expansion in thirteen southern states); SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN
AND DESEGREGATION (Elizabeth Jacoway & David R. Colburn eds., 1982) (discussing
the role of southern businessmen in the development of the "new" South).
97. JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 153; see also PRATI', supra note 10, at 11 (reporting Almond's final defiant pronouncement). In 1957, Charlotte, Greensboro, and
Winston-Salem schools became among the first in the South to integrate by granting
12 black students' requests to transfer to previously all-white schools. DOUGLAS,
supra note 5, at 44.
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"The Fourth Circuit then assimilated Virginia, which enacted
a new pupil placement statute and began to administer it, to
North Carolina."98 During the next several years, the appellate
court thus refused to require that district courts entertain class
action litigation seeking comparatively broad integration as long
as school boards under the pupil placement measures admitted
selected blacks to schools previously attended by whites. 99 The
Fourth Circuit only permitted a specific black plaintiff to sue on
his or her own behalf-after exhausting administrative remedies
prescribed in the legislation-and required the plaintiff to prove
that the board had denied the individual's application expressly
or necessarily for reasons that implicated race. 100 The court's
approach resulted in a small number of black students securing
transfers, but the Fourth Circuit refused to recognize the effective continuation of segregated education and the federal courts
implemented "no comprehensive plan." 101
By 1962, however, the Fourth Circuit had modified the manner in which it proceeded. The court acknowledged that class
actions were appropriate and rejected the requirement that
individual plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies,
refusing to tolerate any longer such practices as "interim measures only." 102 Illustrative of the circuit's change in attitude

98. Bickel, supra note 95, at 204; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-232.1 to .31
(West Supp. 1962) (including Virginia pupil placement laws); PRATI', supra note 10,
at 24-25 (describing the first major challenge in Richmond to the pupil assignment
plan). See generally Epps, supra note 15, at 25~26 (discussing the demise of Massive
Resistance); Note, supra note 35, at 1451-55 (discussing the rise of pupil placement
legislation).
99. See, e.g., Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Beckett v. School Bd., 185 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1959),
affd sub nom. Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960). See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 82 (discussing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board's limited geographic attendance plan); Note, supra note 35, at 1461-65 (discussing the
futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine and the prohibition on bringing class
actions); supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing School Bd. v. Atkins,
246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957)).
100. These reasons had to ·be "unmixed with other plausible reasons, such as residential zoning, overcrowding in the white school, or the pupil's lack of aptitude as
revealed by various tests," while the courts rather indulgently regarded such plausible reasons. Bickel, supra note 95, at 206.
101. Id. at 205-06.
102. Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118, 124 (4th Cir. 1962); see Bickel, supra note
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were 1962 cases involving desegregation of the Roanoke and
Charlottesville public school systems in which the court "pierced
the veil of tokenism, looked beneath at continued biracial zoning, and demanded more comprehensive action."103 In the
Roanoke litigation, the Fourth Circuit did not require the plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in pupil
placement legislation, ascertained that the city's methods for assigning students were infected with racial discrimination, and
ordered Roanoke to develop a plan for complete compliance. 104
The appellate court evinced even greater stringency in the
Charlottesville case. 105 The court first found it "clear that little
change ha[d] been made in the administration of the elementary
schools from that which prevailed when the schools were completely segregated" and that ''little progress in the integration of
the schools" would occur if the school board were "permitted to
pursue the policy which, after mature consideration, it ha[d]
deliberately adopted." 106 The court then scrutinized and invalidated the board's plan for elementary schools because its purpose and effect were to "retard integration and retain the segregation of the races." 107
Soon thereafter, the pace of public school integration began to
quicken in response to the actions of all three branches of the
federal government. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1°8 authorizing the Department of Health, Education and
95, at 206-07 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Green).
103. Bickel, supra note 95, at 206; see Dillard v. School Bd., 308 F.2d 920 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963) (challenging the Charlottesville school system); Green, 304 F.2d 118 (challenging the Roanoke school system). See generally
Rosen, supra note 33, at 508-10 (discussing the unequal administration of pupil
placement programs).
104. See Green, 304 F.2d at 124; see also Marsh v. County· Sch. Bd., 305 F.2d 94
(4th Cir. 1962) (holding unconstitutional Roanoke's administration of pupil placement). See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1460-61 (discussing the inadequacies of
administrative remedies in the school segregation context).
105. See Dillard, 308 F.2d 920; see also Rosen, supra note 33, at 507 n.53 (stating
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Dillard); The Dillard Case, Desegregation, and the
Doctrine of Non-Integration: A Review, 49 VA. L. REV. 367 (1963) (analyzing Dillard).
106. Dillard, 308 F.2d at 922.
107. Id. at 923; see also Jackson v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963) (affording an additional example of the Fourth Circuit's increasingly rigorous approach);
Bradley v. School Bd., 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963) (same).
108. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a
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Welfare to terminate the federal funding of school districts that
resisted integration, and numerous districts desegregated out of
concern that they might lose those resources. 109 The Supreme
Court's resolve to enforce Brown with greater rigor apparently
stiffened during the mid-1960s. This phenomenon was evidenced
in opinions that required the Virginia localities of Prince Edward and New Kent counties to undertake much more vigorous
desegregation efforts. 110 Judge John Minor Wisdom also wrote
several important Fifth Circuit decisions that imposed affirmative requirements on school districts to integrate and authorized
increased judicial supervision of public education. m For exam-

to 2000n-b (1988 & Supp. V)).
109. See DOUGI..AS, supra note 5, at 113, 124-26; ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION 177-78 (1992); James Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 531-37.
Numerous writers have suggested that the Court did not enforce Brown for a decade
and that Congress ultimately became the agent of change. See, e.g., RoSENBERG,
supra note 28, at 39-172; Klarman, supra note 2, at 9-10; McConnell, supra note 9,
at 1133; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of
the Court's decision in Cooper).
110. For example, in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Supreme Court authorized the district judge to order that Prince Edward County reopen and support a system of public schools that did not discriminate on the basis
of race, id. at 234; see also Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 525-30 (discussing the significance of the Prince Edward case). See generally BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR
SCHOOLS: PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1951-1964 (1965) (documenting race
relations in the South); Jonathan L. Entin, Defeasible Fees, State Action and the
Legacy of Massive Resistance, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 769 (1993) (analyzing the
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740 (Va.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 907
(1990), which upheld a whites-only provision in an educational trust). In Green v.
County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Court read Brown II as charging the
New Kent County School Board with the "affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch," id. at 437-38. See generally Rosen, supra note
33, at 525-26 (discussing the Court's rejection in Green of the Briggs v. Elliott, 132
F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1953), philosophy); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 522-30, 537-49
(discussing the Prince Edward case and the freedom of choice concept in Green).
111. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966) (Singleton IJ); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) (Singleton D; see also DOUGLAS, supra
note 5, at 126-27 (discussing Singleton I, Singleton II, and Jefferson); Wilkinson,
supra note 9, at 541-49 (same). See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981)
(recalling the southern judges of the Fifth Circuit and their applications of Brown).
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ple, Judge Wisdom observed that the "only adequate redress for
a previously overt system-wide policy of segregation directed
against Negroes as a collective entity is a system-wide policy of
integration."112

B. Petersburg
Public officials in Petersburg monitored these activities in the
rest of Virginia and the South. 113 The developments seemed to
leave the Petersburg public school system, which remained completely segregated, essentially untouched. 114 Before 1958, Petersburg simply took no steps to integrate its schools and apparently deferred to state authorities, such as the General Assembly and the state pupil placement board. 115 The Petersburg
School Board did not adopt a local pupil placement plan, and it
acted as if the desegregation litigation that involved other locales in the Commonwealth were irrelevant to public education
in the city. 116
Until 1958, the General Assembly's efforts in fashioning, implementing, and defending Massive Resistance and the Petersburg School Board's inaction enabled my white classmates and
me to complete our primary school education at fully segregated
Walnut Hill Elementary. There were no black students and no
black teachers at Walnut Hill. We had no interaction with our
counterparts who were enrolled in historically black primary
schools, and the only contact that most of us had with blacks
involved the domestic employees who labored in our households.
During 1958, however, Reverend Wyatt Tee Walker-a civil
rights advocate and a Southern Christian Leadership Conference
official who had become the minister at Petersburg's Gillfield

112. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 869 (emphasis omitted). For analysis of school desegregation litigation from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s, see
Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v.
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 7, 28-38;
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 549-58. For analysis of subsequent litigation, see DOUGLAS, supra note 5; PRATT, supra note 10.
113. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 25-26; PRATT, supra note 10, at 4.
114. See PRATT, supra note 10, at 4-10.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 4-11. The Richmond School Board acted similarly. See id. at 19-20.
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Baptist Church and who knew of the Adkins case-sued on behalf of his school-aged children seeking the desegregation of
Petersburg's public schools. 117 Reverend Walker filed the case
in the Richmond Division of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, where the district judge allowed
the litigation to languish for several years, apparently because
the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by seeking transfers. 118
After 1958, the Petersburg School Board, like numerous others, developed and applied several stratagems for maintaining
segregated public education and, failing that, for delaying any
integration that was more than token. 119 Geographically centered assignment was one such technique. 120 Placing pupils in
terms of their proximity to educational facilities maintained the
segregated status quo at Walnut Hill Elementary School because
no blacks lived in the relevant neighborhood.
Assignment premised on geography had less efficacy in some
areas of the city. For example, more black schoolchildren probably lived near AP. Hill Elementary School (named for a famous
Confederate general), than did white schoolchildren. The relatively centralized locations of the city-wide junior high and high
schools that whites had always attended concomitantly complicated efforts to employ geography as a means of perpetuating
segregation. Another measure that the Petersburg School Board
and a number of additional districts devised and employed was
"freedom of choice," whereby students could ostensibly select the
schools that they wished to attend. 121

117. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 856-57; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS 245, 284-86 (1988) (detailing Reverend Walker's activities in Virginia and
his appreciation of the Norfolk school closing).
118. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text· (discussing Fourth Circuit
treatment of exhaustion).
119. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 32-36 (discussing delay tactics in North Carolina).
120. See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 141; PRATT, supra note 10, at 27.
121. For discussion of freedom of choice, see KULL, supra note 109, at 176; PRATT,
supra note 10, at 40-55; McKay, supra note 10, at 1053-55; Wilkinson, supra note 9,
at 537-40. "Freedom of choice" had a deceptively egalitarian ring. The "problem with
freedom of choice was the variance between theory and practice." Id. at 539; see also
Walter Gellhom, A Decade of Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9 UTAH L.
REV. 3, 5-8 (1964) (discussing delay of desegregation).
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The deployment of these mechanisms probably enabled the
school board to buy considerable time. In the late 1950s and
early 1960s, some black parents and schoolchildren may have
been unaware that the students could apply to transfer schools.
Many of those blacks who were cognizant of this option may
have been reluctant to pursue it for numerous reasons. For example, most black parents and students would have confronted a
bewildering array of obstacles in attempting to transfer or in exercising their freedom to choose. 122 A number of black parents
and pupils probably found the application process daunting.
Some may have been unwilling to expend innumerable hours
completing lengthy written forms, collecting and furnishing
significant quantities of written documentation, and answering
irrelevant or insulting questions in personal interviews. Other
adults and children may have been especially reluctant to devote
substantial time and effort to a frustrating process in which they
probably would encounter intransigent racist resistance, and
ultimately, rejection.
Many black parents also worked for whites who could impose
economic pressures on their employees. 123 Numerous black students who considered applying knew that, in the extremely unlikely event that the school board granted their transfer requests, white pupils would scrutinize their every act, ridiculing
and demeaning them. 124 This hostile learning environment
that awaited the black students may well have discouraged
them. Some blacks might have been uninterested in attending

122. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539-40 (listing obstacles facing parents and
students); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 47-48 (discussing the barriers that
black parents faced when challenging segregation in the courts).
123. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 47-48; PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 42-43; Hodding
Carter, Desegregation Does Not Mean Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1962, § 6
(Magazine), at 21, 72.
124. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 72 (describing the admission of Dorothy Counts
to Harding High School in Charlotte); MUSE, supra note 19, at 114-15 (recounting
the story of Dorothy Counts, who "was pursued by a rowdy crowd of juveniles ...
jeering, spitting, and throwing pebbles, sticks and paper balls"); U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 88 (1967); see also
WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CML RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA,
AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 100-02 (1980) (discussing hardships that
the first black high school students in Greensboro experienced); PRA'IT, supra note
10, at 32-33 (discussing the experiences in Richmond).
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schools formerly designated for whites or may have wanted to
maintain exclusively black schools, particularly if they had equal
resources. Not surprisingly, few blacks sought transfers or exercised their freedom to choose in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
When some black students, despite insurmountable hurdles,
eventually did apply, the Petersburg School Board relied on
various delaying techniques and questionable tactics to avoid
integrating the schools. 125 One approach was the board's attempt to freeze students in those schools in which they had originally matriculated. 126 This meant that whites who began their
primary education at Walnut Hill Elementary would remain
there for five years and that blacks who commenced their primary schooling at racially segregated elementary facilities with
fewer resources could not leave.
When students obviated this difficulty by finishing their
schooling at specific elementary or junior high facilities and then
seeking to transfer, the school board had various responses. It
could consider applications to be untimely, treat requests as
incomplete and demand voluminous supplemental material that
was costly and inconvenient to supply, or require personal interviews in which members asked burdensome, meaningless, or
humiliating questions. 127 The board also could find the applicants themselves scholastically deficient by employing unfair,
irrelevant, or onerous testing mechanisms. 128
Those blacks who had the enormous fortitude and stamina to
complete the arduous administrative process, but whose transfer
requests the Board rejected, may have lacked the wherewithal to
continue the fight by appealing adverse determinations. Many of
these individuals probably had limited time, money, and energy
to complete their applications, much less to pursue courtroom

125. See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 141; PRATI', supra note 10, at 13-14, 31, 36,
42; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539-40. See generally Rosen, supra note 33, at 50810 (discussing the assignment system in Roanoke).
126. See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 141 (discussing this practice in Richmond).
127. "Sometimes birth and health certificates, personal appearances and notarized
forms were required." Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539. See generally DOUGLAS, supra
note 5, at 63 (discussing the effect of attempted transfers).
128. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 540 (discussing academically unprepared black
students).
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litigation. 129 Even those blacks who might have entertained the
thought of filing cases could have been dissuaded by the discouraging prospect of suing in the Richmond court of the federal
judge who had delayed resolution of the Walker desegregation
litigation since 1958.130
Very few white parents or pupils manifested much interest in
those schools that blacks previously had attended. 131 Whites
simply had little reason to enroll in educational facilities that
had never received· as many resources, to attend schools in
which the whites knew no students and would constitute a tiny
minority, and to undertake an act for which they would be
ostracized.132 In short, whites, who technically possessed considerable freedom to choose, had minimal incentive to select
schools previously attended solely by black schoolchildren. In
contrast, blacks had little actual freedom to choose, and even
the small number who exercised this option were unlikely to be
successful. 133
These machinations of the state and local school authorities
easily enabled my white classmates and me to conclude three
years at Anna P. Bolling Junior High School and most of our
four years at Petersburg High School with little awareness that
our city-wide schools might be desegregated. We did not know of
the efforts that ostensibly had been undertaken on our behalf.
For example, the school board automatically enrolled at Bolling
Junior High all white students who completed their education at
Walnut Hill Elementary or any other primary facility previously
attended by whites while enrolling no pupils who finished their
schooling at any of the black elementary schools, even though a
number of blacks lived closer to that junior high school.
Many students from Walnut Hill actually were more conscious
129. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Ciuil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485,
495-98 (1988-1989). See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 38-39 (discussing the persistence of some ppents); TuSHNET, supra note 12, at 34, 311 (discussing the
NAACP legal staff).
130. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; see also PRATI', supra note 10,
at 40-55 (providing additional helpful analysis of freedom of choice); Wilkinson, supra
note 9, at 539-49 (same).
131. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 32, 42; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539.
132. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 32, 42.
133. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539-40.

1286

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1261

of class than of race. These Walnut Hill students, the families of
whom owned expensive homes, drove fancy cars, and wore nice
clothes, believed themselves superior to the blue collar pupils.
Numerous whites from Walnut Hill had no greater contact with
working-class whites than with blacks and accorded them little
more respect. A number of the blue collar students justifiably
resented the arrogant whites and vented this frustration by
beating them up during recess and lunch. I escaped the terrorizing by playing basketball on the playground with working-class
pupils who did not participate in the fights. 134
For many white students, the years in high school passed
with few concerns about integration. Desegregation loomed
somewhat larger only during my senior year, and what actually
occurred at that time was mere tokenism. Even in high school,
most white students remained oblivious to the measures that
the city had instituted to limit integration. Petersburg High
School had no black students or teachers throughout my freshman, sophomore, and junior years, and I had virtually no contact with my black contemporaries.
To be sure, our faculty taught, and white pupils believed, that
aggressive Yankees started the Civil War and bludgeoned into
submission a valiant, severely disadvantaged South for reasons
that were imperceptibly related to race. One history teacher
delighted in proclaiming that John Wilkes Booth's birthday
should be celebrated as a national holiday. Whites made deprecating comments about blacks and delivered racial epithets in
educational and social settings. Much of my exposure to this
type of activity came when playing basketball for the Petersburg
Crimson Wave against schools with teams named for venerable
Virginia lawyers, such as the John Marshall Justices. The most
egregious incidents involved the apparently insatiable sexual
drives of adolescent white boys from Walnut Hill. Ironically, the
most virulen~ racists would boast in colloquial phrasing too

134. Integration was closely linked to class. For example, in Little Rock, integration
occurred first at Central High School, attended primarily by working-class whites,
rather than at the school in Pulaski Heights, which was principally attended by
upper-class whites. See FREYER, supra note 33, at 16-17. In junior high school, I
remember having as few interactions with blacks and as few discussions of race as I
had in elementary school.
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crude to print how they had proven their manhood in
Petersburg's black neighborhoods. 135
When a local attorney learned that I was considering attendance at law school after college, he told me a similarly outrageous story. The attorney offered as part of the job description
what a lawyer ·might do for his imaginary white male client who
had impregnated a black woman. The attorney explained that
the lawyer would offer the woman sufficient money to leave
town and keep quiet, thereby protecting his client's interests. To
this day, I have wondered why the attorney thought that this
example would encourage me to attend law school.
In my senior year, the Petersburg School Board, like many
others, seized on the dilatory tactic of token desegregation by
permitting a tiny number of blacks to attend Petersburg High
School. I remember the first day of school in September 1963 as
though it were yesterday. I was standing on the front steps of
Petersburg High School preparing to begin my senior year. We
were cocky and preoccupied with the trivialities that absorb
teenagers-clothes, music, and sports. The preppies among us
were sporting brand new madras shirts, Villager blouses, and
Weejuns.
I recall comparing my summer tan with that of one of the
cheerleaders. We were as dark as many blacks whom the school
board would not admit to our high school; however, the irony
was completely lost on us. I had finished what I considered to be
a successful summer, finely honing my basketball skills and
waiting to be a high school hero. When the bell rang forcing us
all indoors, several black students entered the building and
became members of the class of 1964. In this utterly uneventful,
anticlimactic manner, Petersburg formally integrated its public
schools.
The opening of a new Petersburg High School in 1970 represented the consummate irony of the city's desegregation battle.
The school board originally had authorized the building's construction in a location that was most distant from neighborhoods
in which blacks resided, apparently to rely on patterns of residential segregation when placing students in schools. The Su135. See JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 139 (1937).
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preme Court criticized pupil assignments that were premised on
geography immediately after construction commenced but before
the new structure opened. 136 This meant that considerable integration soon followed in Petersburg and that blacks became
the principal beneficiaries of the state-of-the-art high school.
During the late 1960s, the pace of public education's integration began to accelerate. For several years, many parents of
white schoolchildren continued to support the public school system. As integration of the Petersburg public schools increased,
however, whites reduced their economic, moral, and other support of public education. By the early 1970s, most of the white
parents whose children attended public schools were individuals
who lacked sufficient resources to pursue other options.
From the time that the Supreme Court issued Brown, numerous white parents and pupils began exploring various alternatives to public education. Some parents sent their children to
preparatory schools, such as Episcopal High School in Alexandria or St. Christopher's School in Richmond. A few students
attended military schools, like those advertised in the New York
Times Sunday magazine, or Saint Joseph's, the local parochial
school.
A number of white parents also created Bollingbrook Day
School, which had such limited resources that it probably afforded a considerably poorer education than did the public schools. I
remember neighbors who purchased shares in the venture as a
hedge for their children against threats that the public schools
would close or would be fully integrated. I also recall a prominent local physician who sent his two children to Bollingbrook
and accepted state tuition vouchers when doing so. My mother
severely criticized the doctor for abandoning public education
and for taking the vouchers. The students who remained in
public schools promptly ostracized the physician's children.
No one in Petersburg established a Christian Academy like
those that sprung up across much of Southside Virginia and the

136. See Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 28;
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 522-23. See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 154-56
(discussing school construction in Richmond); TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1490 (discussing the Court's decision in Goss).
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rest of the South after Brown. As public school integration increased, however, a growing number of parents sent their children to Tidewater Academy, which was located twenty miles
away. That activity exposed the hypocrisy of certain observers
who criticized busing to achieve integration. 137

III.

INTEGRATION OF OTHER PUBLIC FACILITIES IN PETERSBURG

This account of public school desegregation epitomizes similar
developments involving the integration of other public facilities.
For instance, during 1958, the Petersburg City Council voted to
close Wilcox Lake, a substantial body of water owned by the city
that was popular with white residents who had long used it for
swimming, fishing, and picnicking. 138 The Council apparently
decided to terminate public use of the facility because it feared
that Reverend Walker and other black leaders would seek to
integrate the lake139 and because a 1958 Supreme Court decision seemed to mandate integration. 140
I remember Wilcox Lake as one of the few oases available to
local residents who sought relief from the unbearable heat and
humidity that plague Southside Virginia during the summer.
The recreation area also served as a social gathering spot for
several generations of white Petersburg residents. My clearest
recollections are· of high school football players who served as
lifeguards, high school cheerleaders who worked in the bathhouse or the snack bar, and 1950 red Fords-the vehicle of
choice for teenage males.
In 1963, the city council reopened Wilcox Lake for fishing, but
the lake has remained closed for swimming to this day. 141 The
137. Professor Douglas identifies the closely related irony that "busing was used
extensively until the mid-1960s to maintain racially defined public schools" in North
Carolina. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 44; accord PRATI', supra note 10, at 58.
138. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 857.
139. See id.
140. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(per curiam); see also Holley v. City of Portsmouth, 150 F. Supp. 6, 7 (E.D. Va.
1957) (involving segregation of golf courses). See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at
58 (discussing "behind-the-scenes" desegregation); McKay, supra note 9, at 709-13,
717-20 (discussing the legal challenges to the segregation of parks and public swimming pools).
141. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 857; see also MUSE, supra note 19, at 171 (report-
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council members apparently thought that a partial reopening
was more likely to withstand legal challenge and to preserve
what they probably viewed as the most important form of segregation. The Council seemed very concerned about whites and
blacks swimming in the same water body, interracial socializing,
and all of the problems that the Council seemingly believed
could result from those activities.
Lee Park Golf Course, a municipal golf course that Petersburg
named for General Robert E. Lee, may have presented an easier
case on the law and the facts. During 1955, the Supreme Court
had issued a per curiam opinion that clearly required integration.142 Moreover, this facility's integration might have seemed
comparatively unthreatening. Relatively few blacks may have
wanted, or could have afforded, to play golf, and the tiny number who did would only be sharing the course, the restroom, and
the water fountains. When blacks requested that they be allowed to use the facility, the city simply acquiesced. In the final
analysis, Lee Park's desegregation probably had greater symbolic than actual importance because golf was one of the most significant trappings of white privilege. Indeed, many blacks probably were more concerned about earning a decent wage than
playing golf. 143

ing that the South Carolina legislature passed a resolution requesting the State
Library Board to remove from circulation books that included illustrations of whites
and blacks swimming together); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The
Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 775 (1995) (affording a similar account of swimming areas in Cairo, Illinois).
142. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) (per curiam); see also
Holley, 150 F. Supp. at 7 (abolishing the separate-but-equal doctrine in the context
of golf courses). See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 60-61 (describing an integration dispute at a municipal golf course in Charlotte, North Carolina); McKay,
supra note 9, at 713-17 (describing similar golf course cases that arose in Florida
and Texas).
143. Petersburg treated the public basketball and tennis courts similarly, perhaps
for numerous analogous reasons, such as the Supreme Court rulings in Detiege, 358
U.S. 54, and Holmes, 350 U.S. 879, and the Eastern District's ruling in Holley, 150
F. Supp. 6, which required desegregation of municipal facilities. See also Wright v.
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292 (1963) (invalidating the prosecution of blacks for peacefully playing basketball on a pub1ic playground). See generally Entin, supra note 110,
at 773-81 (describing Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, Inc. v. Dominion
Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741 (Va.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990), a case involving a conveyance of land that was contingent upon the exclusion of blacks from
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The Petersburg City Council voted to close the public library
in May 1960, after hundreds of black residents staged several
sit-ins seeking the library's integration. 144 The building that
housed the library was a private residence that Clara McKenney
had donated to the city in 1924.145 The bequest provided that
the main and second floors were to be maintained as a library
for whites and that the basement, which was served by a separate entrance, was to be a ~brary for blacks. 146 The gift probably was considered progressive at the time of the donation because it made some provision for blacks.
When blacks peacefully entered the library to protest its segregation, Petersburg convicted in municipal court a number of
the demonstration's participants, including Reverend Walker, for
trespassing; however, the charges were dismissed on appeal to
Petersburg Hustings Court. 147 Petersburg's black citizens also
filed suit in the Richmond federal district court seeking to integrate the library. 148 The library remained closed until November, when the city council reversed its decision and opened the
facility to all residents. 149
Local politics in Petersburg reflected similar attitudes. Thorough exposition of the machinations that attended the city
council's desegregation must await subsequent treatment, but
Petersburg politics deserve brief examination here. 150 Whites

its use); McKay, supra note 9, at 720-21 (describing the integration of tennis courts).
144. Tobias, supra note 9, at 858-59. See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 58,
61 (describing the efforts to desegregate in Charlotte, North Carolina, after Brown);
McKay, supra note 9, at 722-23 (describing the desegregation of public libraries);
infra note 156 and accompanying text (describing sit-ins at private businesses).
145. Tobias, supra note 9, at 855.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 860, 864-66. The judge may have been prescient. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (holding that the application of a disorderly conduct
statute to blacks who peacefully assembled at a public library violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
148. Tobias, supra note 9, at 863.
149. Id. at 867.
150. To gain a sense of those machinations, see City of Petersburg v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1022-27 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 410 U.S. 962, and affd sub
nom. Diamond v. United States, 412 U.S. 901 (1973). Authors have written entire
books about voting rights. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 10; ABIGAIL M.
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS (1987).
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comprised only a bare majority of the city's population, but state
and local authorities formulated and applied numerous measures to dilute black voting strength. For example, Virginia
imposed various restrictions on suffrage, such as literacy tests
and poll taxes, which meant that a relatively small number of
blacks actually registered and voted. 151
The city concomitantly devised and employed other techniques
to limit black electoral power. For instance, when comparatively
few blacks voted, city-wide or at-large balloting enabled whites
to maintain control. Once more, when blacks secured the franchise and approached a majority of Petersburg's electorate, the
city resorted to annexing the overwhelmingly white suburbs in
the surrounding counties. 152
During the early 1960s, whites who held moderate political
views on racial issues commanded a Council majority, a phenomenon that the library's reopening probably evidenced. In
1964, a white candidate who favored segregation chose to run,
and a black candidate who supported integration decided to seek
office. Both won election, which splintered the Council, effectively destroying the moderate coalition that had existed. Electoral
politics thereafter became increasingly bitter and divided along
racial lines. During 1968, blacks threatened to capture a majority of the city council's seats. This development apparently terrified many whites and led to an "unusually large turnout of
white voters in the white wards, as a result of which [the black
incumbent] was defeated and the second black candidate also
lost." 153
151. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 n.1 (1966) (describing a provision in Virginia's Constitution that required imposition of a poll tax);
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 47 (1959) (describing a provision
in North Carolina's Constitution requiring imposition of a literacy test); see also City
of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1025 (describing the restrictions on the ability of
blacks to vote). See generally STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN
THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976) (describing the process by which blacks gained the
right to vote); TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1092-94 (explaining that conditioning the
right to vote on poll taxes and literacy tests is unconstitutional); TuSHNET, supra
note 12, at 99-115 (describing white attempts to exclude black voters and black attempts to obtain the vote).
152. See City of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1022; see also PRATT, supra note 10, at
47-48 (describing a similar annexation effort in Richmond).
153. City of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1026 (citation omitted).
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Public sector employment in Petersburg manifested analogous
considerations. The city integrated this area of great symbolic
and practical significance with no more "deliberate speed" than
it had public education. I remember that no blacks served in the
Petersburg fire or police departments when I was attending
public schools. 154 Indeed, as recently as 1972, only one of seventy fire fighters was black. 155
IV. INTEGRATION OF PRIVATE FACILITIES IN PETERSBURG

Private facilities, such as restaurants and motels, that were
open to the public pursued various courses of action in response
to sit-in demonstrations at lunch counters and other businesses
across the South. 156 A few proprietors simply ceased operations. For example, Rucker-Rosenstock's, a large downtown department store, shut the doors of its Tea Room, where the upper-middle-class ladies of Petersburg had often lunched.
Some owners were openly defiant. One downtownrestauranteur,
whose establishment my family frequented for Sunday breakfast
and for occasional suppers, posted prominently in the front window a large ''Whites Only'' sign. I did not understand why he
needed to proclaim publicly his long-standing practice of refusing service to blacks.
Sit-in demonstrations by black residents and the public accommodations provisions· that Congress included in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 forced most businesses to desegregate. 157
154. Petersburg certainly was not alone in its discrimination against blacks in
these departments. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1986) (involving race discrimination in the hiring and
promoting of fire fighters); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,
565 (1984) (involving the underrepresentation of blacks in a fire department); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1555 (5th Cir. 1984) (involving race
discrimination in the selection, training, and promotion of police officers).
155. See City of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1027 n.12; see also Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755, 776-77 n.12 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting the history of
racial discrimination in the fire and police departments of Birmingham, Alabama).
156. See Daniel H. Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems
of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315; Note, Lunch Counter Demonstrations: State
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 VA. L. REV. 105 (1961).
157. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Tobias,
supra note 9, at 857; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in
places of public accommodation). See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 85-87, 96-
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For instance, the Trailways Bus Station, which was located next
door to my father's office, eventually merged the waiting areas,
restrooms, and drinking fountains that previously had· been
separate. 158
Numerous commercial entities initially avoided the issue altogether. Some, by virtue of their geographic locations, were inaccessible to many blacks, particularly individuals who lacked
private transportation. A few sold goods or provided services in
which most blacks had little interest or that they could not afford. A number of businesses merely relied on long-standing
customs and patterns of commercial dealing. Few blacks may
have wanted to enter stores in which members of their race had
never shopped or to purchase goods from merchants who clearly
discouraged black patrons. Indeed, old habits apparently die
hard. For example, in a recent visit to a particular Petersburg
restaurant, a premiere purveyor of southern barbecue and a
longtime favorite of white diners, I noticed practically no blacks
working or eating in the establishment, although numerous
blacks purchased barbecue at the carry-out area, which has a
separate entrance. 159
The local transportation company was called the Petersburg
Bus Lines; however, the corporation was a quasi-private entity.
The buses afforded a compelling illustration of the power of
custom in matters of race. Custom dictated that whites sit in the
front and blacks sit in the rear of buses in Petersburg, as in
nearly all southern cities. I remember no blacks challenging this
longstanding tradition. 160 State and local authorities
97 (describing protests in Charlotte, North Carolina); Note, Recent Statute, The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARV. L. REV. 684, 687-88 (1965) (analyzing the Civil Rights
Act's public accommodations provision).
158. See PAULI MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT 138-49 (1987) (describing the
1940 arrest of the book's author and a companion in Petersburg for challenging
segregated seating on buses transporting interstate passengers).
159. This practice was, and apparently remains, typical. See, e.g., Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964) (providing a similar description of Ollie's Barbecue).
160. See MURRAY, supra note 158, at 138-42, 232-38 (relating the consequences for
blacks who violated this rule and discussing challenges to segregated seating on
buses in Virginia). For discussion of Montgomery, Alabama, see Gayle v. Browder,
142 F. Supp. 707, 711 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); FRED D. GRAY, Bus
RIDE TO JUSTICE (1995). See also Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 239
F.2d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1956) (discussing South Carolina); DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at
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throughout the South would pursue disorderly conduct charges
against individuals who had the temerity to violate that understanding-though few statutes or ordinances clearly mandated
the arrangement, 161 and the Supreme Court had invalidated
segregated seating on buses engaged in interstate travel in
1946. 162
Ironically, an overwhelming majority of people who owned
small businesses in the city indicated their willingness to serve
all comers, regardless of race. In a poll conducted by the Petersburg Improvement Society, a biracial commission constituted at
the city council's instigation to foster interracial dialogue, eighty
percent of those surveyed responded affirmatively, although the
results were not publicized. 163
It is certainly easy to understate-and this account may unintentionally oversimplify-the subtle and complex nature of the
issues that were at stake in integrating all of these facilities
during the decade aftei: Brown. To caricature all whites as racists and all blacks as heroes is too facile and simply incorrect.164 The reality was considerably more complicated for citizens of both races.
Some whites attempted to pursue comparatively moderate,

58 (discussing Charlotte).
161. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 160, at 50; MURRAY, supra note 158, at 138-45
(recounting her arrest for disorderly conduct). See generally CATHERINE A. BARNES,
JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT (1983) (examining the struggle to end segregation in southern transportation).
162. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946); see also Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (affirming the district court's decision invalidating intrastate
segregated seating); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1025
(D.D.C. 1972) (describing the "long history of racial segregation and discrimination"
in Petersburg resulting from the "operation of laws, customs, and official and individual behavior"), affd, 410 U.S. 962, and affd sub nom. Diamond v. United States,
412 U.S. 901 (1973); Eastman, supra note 141, at 773-77 (describing Cairo, Illinois,
similarly).
163. Interview with individuals familiar with the Petersburg Improvement Society
poll who requested anonymity; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 58-61, 86 (describing a similar commission and a similar poll in Charlotte).
164. Cf. Patricia N. Limerick, The Canon Debate from a Historian's Perspectiue, 43
J. LEGAL EDUC. 4, 7-8 (1993) (asserting that 15% of the members of every group are
jerks). See generally NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64 (1971) (describing the movement of
resistance against desegregation).
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efficacious approaches, and a few even openly opposed Massive
Resistance. Some blacks similarly tried to find relatively conciliatory, effective courses of action. Although a number of blacks
pressed for desegregation, numerous blacks were indifferent to
or uncomfortable with integration, fearing that whites would
retaliate against all blacks for efforts to end segregation. Some
blacks apparently preferred to retain traditionally black schools,
especially if they were fully funded.
Illustrative of rather moderate, constructive approaches were
the endeavors of the Petersburg Improvement Society in searching for common ground and seeking to limit polarization on
racial issues. The efforts of the blacks and whites who were
involved in this work were laudable and unusual. It is difficult
to overestimate the enormous pressures that people and groups
that participated in these activities experienced. The slightest
deviation from rigid opposition to integration could promptly end
the careers of white public officials, teachers, and politicians. 165
Small business owners or attorneys who did not support separate facilities might lose patrons or clients and become social
outcasts in the white community. 166
The sheer number and strength of segregation's proponents
overwhelmed these persons and entities. Less moderate individuals and organizations frustrated their efforts. For example,
numerous white politicians capitalized on the fears and prejudices of whites who had few resources or who were members of the
lower or middle classes. Those whites, together with the remaining middle- and upper-class whites, comprised an electoral
majority that usually could defeat the small, but growing, numbers of recently enfranchised blacks. In the end, it was probably
unrealistic to expect that whites and blacks would immediately,
or even "with all deliberate speed," overcome generations and
centuries of ingrained racism, distrust, resentment, fear, and
hatred and become fully committed participants in a common
endeavor whose ultimate outcome promised to be uncertain.

165. See, e.g., BARTLEY, supra note 14, at 192-93; Douglas, supra note 1, at 128;
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 500-01.
166. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (describing the ostracization of
lower federal court judges in the South).

1996]

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA

1297

V. IMPLICATIONS

To identify clearly and precisely all of the ramifications of the
ten-year hiatus that ensued between the Supreme Court's issuance of Brown and the integration of Virginia's public schools is
virtually impossible. The Massive Resistance, delay, tokenism,
and evasion practiced by the Virginia General Assembly and by
the various city and county school boards enabled many local
school districts to avoid any desegregation throughout the entire
decade.
On Brown's tenth anniversary, the percentage of black students who were attending integrated public schools in Virginia
was minuscule and differed minimally from North Carolina.
Desegregation in t~e two states was nearly indistinguishable
when one allows for significant variability between the Old
Dominion's school districts in metropolitan areas, such as
Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia, a number of which were
comparatively responsive, and less urban locales, such as
Southside Virginia, most of which were resistant. For instance,
Norfolk integrated its schools in 1959, while Petersburg did not
desegregate until 1963 and then only in a token manner. 167
All of the implications of the decade-long delay are difficult to
delineate exactly; however, the profound actual and symbolic .
nature of the consequences warrants an attempt to identify
them. The passage of ten years without integration had subtle,
complex, palpable, and intangible ramifications for individuals,
groups, Virginia, and society that affected these people and
institutions economically, politically, morally, and socially.
The successful efforts to prevent integration by the General
Assembly and the Petersburg School Board left my white classmates and me essentially untouched by Brown. The decade-long
hiatus allowed many of us to remain ignorant of racial issues,
particularly in school, and of black people as individuals. We
could only dimly perceive that Brown's implementation had been
delayed, and we had no sense of the education that our black
contemporaries were receiving, much less of their personal lives.

167. See supra notes 49-89 and accompanying text; supra part II.B. I recognize that
Norfolk desegregated its schools only after lengthy and sharply contested litigation.
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I can recall only a tiny number of serious conversations about
racial questions during the whole period of my public education,
and even fewer in homes, social contexts, or religious institutions. Most persons and entities in Petersburg treated matters of
race as taboo subjects for discussion, polite or otherwise, and
effectively relegated them to irrelevance. I remember few whites
who were troubled that blacks attended schools with limited
resources or that state and local authorities were evading
Brown's promise, while most whites had minimal contact with
blacks. Whites who did voice these concerns or who had contact
with blacks instantaneously were stigmatized and branded with
the epithet "nigger lover." 168
The ten years that elapsed between the time of Brown's issuance and integration meant that the 175 white students in my
graduating class received public school educations that were
nearly identical to those of their predecessors. The seventy-five
pupils who successfully completed the college preparatory courses of study easily gained college admission, and the students
who wished to escape the insufferable insularity of a small
southern town capitalized on that opportunity. Not a single one
of my close high school friends now lives in Petersburg.
I am uncertain what the decade-long delay meant for the
black pupils who attended segregated schools, which, despite the
mandate of Brown, remained separate and unequal during that
period. 169 The stalling tactics of the General Assembly and of
local school boards limited the promise of economic and social
equality, fair treatment, and improved public education that
Brown represented. 170 So long as Petersburg could maintain
segregated schools, the city would spend significantly more on
the facilities that whites attended. 171 To the extent that resources constitute a measure of educational quality, black pupils
apparently had decreased opportunities to acquire the schooling
and skills that they would need to compete in an increasingly

Se~

BARTLEY, supra note 14, at 192-93; RODDING CARTER, THE SOUTH STRIKES
18 (1959); DOLLARD, supra note 135, at 46-48; PRATI', supra note 10, at 4.
169. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 38; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 485-87.
170. Cf. PRATI', supra note 10, at 4-10, 19-30, 54 (discussing stalling tactics).
171. Id. at 15 (discussing the lack of funds and concern necessary to equalize black
schools with white schools in Richmond).
168.

BACK
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complex world. 172 Black students simply may have confronted
greater obstacles to achieving what ostensibly remains one of
America's most cherished dreams: the ability of individuals to
realize their fullest potential as citizens.
I believe that all pupils forfeited the benefits that would have
resulted from basic, daily educational, political, social, and personal interactions among students of different races. This interplay might have begun the slow, arduous, painful, but critically
important, process of breaking down the intractable, centuriesold barriers that implicate race. That erosion had to await comparatively unsystematic interactions in other somewhat less
congenial contexts, such as workplaces, the military, commercial
dealings, and politics.
Petersburg has not thrived in the period since the integration
of the public schools. The decade-long delay and the years of
overheated rhetoric may have contributed to, even if they did
not precipitate, Petersburg's downward economic spiral. In fairness, the city's financial outlook has not improved since the
1950s, and it is impossible to identify conclusively a direct
cause-effect relationship between the fiscal circumstances and
what happened during the decade after Brown.
Most of the major industrial employers terminated their Petersburg operations or relocated. For example, the Brown and
Williamson Tobacco Company, which provided 7000 jobs-some
for the 100 white graduates in the Petersburg High School class
of 1964 who did not attend college-built a new plant in Macon,
Georgia, and invited all employees of the Petersburg facility to
relocate to Macon. The corporation wanted to install state-of-theart equipment and apparently wished to hire a less expensive,
more compliant work force. Many of the whites in Petersburg,
whose children now comprise less than five percent of the pupils
attending public schools, cannot afford to send them elsewhere,
while most of the remaining whites provide minimal support for
public education. 173

172. Id. (describing the inferior quality of resources in Richmond's black schools).
173. Cf. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 216 (describing the phenomenon of "white
flight" in Charlotte); PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 48-53 (describing the phenomenon of
"white flight" in Richmond).
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The symbolic effects of the ten-year hiatus may have been
nearly as deleterious as the very detrimental, pragmatic impacts.174 Several harmful effects resulted from the Supreme
Court's apparent willingness, out of a perceived need to assuage
southern white sensitivities, to undercut Brown's moral
force. 175 The Court eroded Brown by enunciating the "all deliberate speed" formulation, 176 by essentially acquiescing in the
South's successful efforts to evade the law and to prevent integration, 177 by abandoning the school desegregation arena for a
decade, and by concomitantly leaving enforcement to local, lower-court judges. 178 The Justices undermined the Court's own
prestige and power, sharply circumscribed its ability to function
as a constructive instrument of social change, and exposed the
limitations of purely legal approaches to complicated, controversial societal issues. 179 The Justices also dampened the aspirations of many Americans and dashed the hopes, especially of
blacks, that they would receive fair and equal treatment under
the law. 180
VI .. EXPLANATIONS

To ascertain how the Commonwealth of Virginia and the City
of Petersburg were able to avoid integration of the public schools
during the decade after Brown is a complex and subtle task. The
coalescence of numerous factors, some of which are related,
enabled the Old Dominion, Petersburg, and much of the remainder of the South to resist desegregation for most of the relevant
period.
One important explanation is that the Supreme Court essen-

174. See supra note 28.
175. See supra note 28.
176. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see Tushnet & Lezin,
supra note 28, at 1867.
177. See Carter, supra note 28, at 243-44; cf. Burt, supra note 28, at 1483 (noting
conventional accounts of the Court's acquiescence but arguing that other reasons
may have motivated the Court's approach).
178. See BICKEL, supra note 28, at 254; Carter, supra note 28, at 245-46;
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 486, 541.
179. See RoSENBERG, supra note 28, at 72-93; Carter, supra note 28, at 246.
180. See ROSENBERG, supra note 28, at 132-33.
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tially left integration to ~outhern circuit and district court judges
for the ten years following its announcement of the "all deliberate speed" articulation in Brown Il. 181 If the Court failed to exhibit the clear, strong resolve, to exercise moral leadership and
to afford the instructive guidance that might have led to Brown's
rigorous effectuation, it is unclear why lower federal court judges would have insisted upon integration's vigorous implementation. After all, those circuit and district judges came out of, and
lived and worked in, the same society that had perpetuated
segregation for centuries.
Indeed, it is remarkable that so many federal judges, such as
Judge Walter Hoffman of Virginia, Judge Frank Johnson of
Alabama, and Judges John Minor Wisdom and Skelly Wright of
Louisiana had the courage to ensure that Brown and the Constitution received rigorous enforcement. 182 Their actions assume
even greater significance in light of the enormous pressures that
state and local legislative bodies, politicians, lawyers, the media,
and society imposed on these judges. Most of the judges received
death threats, and a number of their fellow citizens treated
them as pariahs. 183
Another important explanation for Virginia's ability to limit
integration during the post-Brown decade was a distinct southern mentality. 184 Many white residents of the Old Dominion
had never forgotten the South's defeat in the Civil War or the

· 181. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 505-06; see also id. at 541 (asserting that "[i)t
is a measure of the Supreme Court's inconspicuousness that the most influential
school opinions from Brown II to Green v. County School Board in 1968 were written by two lower federal judges") (citation omitted); supra note 33 and accompanying
text (noting that the Supreme Court decided only one major case involving desegregation between 1955 and 1963). See generally PELTASON, supra note 31 (discussing
the role of southern federal judges in school desegregation).
182. See, e.g., JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE
FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS (1993); BASS,
supra note 111 (discussing Fifth Circuit judges); PELTASON, supra note 31 (discussing
all southern federal judges); Abner J. Mikva, Remembering Skelly Wright, 98 YALE
L.J. 211 (1988); supra notes 49-89 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Hoffman); supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Wisdom).
183. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 176; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 507; see also
Roger K Newman, Black and Brown, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 635, 642 (1995) (describing
ostracization of Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black for participation in Brown).
184. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 19-20; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 495-505, 512-15.
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conflict's aftermath. 185 They remembered the ostensible reason
for fighting the war-to maintain that "peculiar institution" of
slavery-the perceived humiliation that the North had visited on
the South during Reconstruction, the concomitant economic
decline that most of the region had long suffered, and the apparent disdain with which much of the remainder of the nation
viewed the South. 186 For numerous white Virginians, Brown's
issuance and its imminent implementation may well have resembled a second Reconstruction imposed by sanctimonious
Yankees who maintained schools that were as segregated as
many in the Old Confederacy but who claimed to know what
was best for backward Southerners. 187
Brown and its effectuation promised to strike at the very
essence of the southern way of life for many whites, especially
those with limited resources or who were lower or middle class.
Particularly feared was the possibility of black "domination in
all its forms: political, economic, social, and sexual."188 For instance, if blacks registered and voted, they might have elected
local office holders, imposed high assessments and taxes on
whites, filled the schools and police departments with blacks,
and called whites to task before the law. 189
Desegregated schools raised even more pointedly than voting
the prospect of black control. 190 Educated blacks could have
been demanding; they would have sought, and might have secured, everything imaginable, including jobs that previously had
been the exclusive domain of whites. 191 Too much schooling

185. See WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 170-71.
186. See id. at 167-91.
187. See, e.g., CARL M. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1977); JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 131-39; PRATT, supra note 10, at 1-2. See
generally MCMILLEN, supra note 164 (examining the history of the Citizens' Council
and its resistance to desegregation).
188. Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497; see also PRATT, supra note 10, at 29 ("At
stake here was a way of life.").
189. See ALEXANDER HEARD, A Two-PARTY SOUTH (1952); see also supra notes 15055 and accompanying text (discussing politics in Petersburg). See generally PAUL
LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS & PARTY 79-97 (1963) (discussin~ the disfranchisement of
black voters).
190. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497.
191. See id.; see also Henry L. Gates, Jr., A Dangerous Literacy: The- Legacy of
Frederick Douglass, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 7 (Book Review), at 3 (noting the
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would yield employees who were dissatisfied with performing
menial labor as domestics or farm workers and who complained
about their economic circumstances. 192
The largest fear-even eclipsing concerns that blacks would
dominate politics, education, or employment-was social. 193
The ~mage that struck terror in the hearts of many white Southerners was social interaction between the races. The mere possibility that both white and black students would attend school
dances after football games or the junior prom was unthinkable.
A contemporaneous account that appeared in the popular magazine Look accurately captured these ideas:
[Southerners] will tell you that sooner or later, some Negro
boy will be walking his daughter home from school, staying
for supper, taking her to the movies ... and then your Southern friend asks you the inevitable, the clinching question:
"Would you want your daughter to marry a Nigra ... ?"
[S]exual neurosis makes many white[s] impervious to logic.
They are obsessed by the notion that Negroes, given a
chance, will take over their women as well as their golf clubs
and legislatures. 194

The white inhabitants of Southside Virginia, in the center of
which stood Petersburg, held these attitudes most broadly and
fervently. 195 Southside comprised the Commonwealth's black
belt. 196 Southside whites fully appreciated that compliance
·with Brown would be most problematic in areas that had the
largest black populations 197 and that integration in locales
with few blacks eventually could isolate the black belt. 198 Poli-

disquiet of some abolitionists at Douglass's literary skill).
192. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497.
193. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 587 (1944); PRATT, supra note
10, at 29; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497.
194. William Attwood, Fear Underlies the Conflict, LoOK, Apr. 3, 1956, at 26; see
ELY, supra note 37, at 97 (reproducing similar, but more subtle, statements of Senator Byrd and Governor Almond); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497 (suggesting that
"the driving fear was the least rational, and it was social").
195. See PRATT, supra note 10, at 1-4; ROUSE, supra note 10, at 9; WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 9-22; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496.
196. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496.
197. See PRATT, supra note 10, at 4; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496, 498.
198. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496, 498.
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ticians from this region, therefore, developed and effectuated a
strategy of rigid and absolute statewide opposition to integration. 199 In 1956, Mills Godwin, a Southside state senator
who later served two terms as governor, summarized these
views: "Integration, however slight, anywhere in Virginia
would be a cancer eating at the very life blood of our public ·
school system."200
The resistance to integrating public education in Virginia reflected certain economic, social, and geographic realities. It
could also be ascribed to some important political
practicalities. For instance, Massive Resistance was a central
tenet of the Byrd machine, the powerful political organization
centered in Virginia's courthouses, that Senator Harry Flood
Byrd, Sr., established and perpettiated. 201 Efforts to minimize
school integration and to limit black political strength were
thus intertwined.
Phenomena relating to class as well could explain the opposition to public school integration. For example, integrated public
education did not seriously threaten upper-class whites. 202
Those individuals rarely used public facilities, could afford to
send their children to private schools, and had virtually no contact with blacks, so that desegregated education would not
jeopardize their prerogatives economically, politically, socially,
or in workplaces. 203 In sharp contrast, numerous whites who
possessed limited resources or who were members of the lower
or middle class, perceived public school integration as a palpable threat to their financial, political, employment, and social
circumstances. 204

199. See id. at 498-99.
200. 27 Backers of Stanley Plan Speak Out at Public Hearing, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, Sept. 5, 1956, at 1, 8; see also James Latimer, State Democrats Back
Firm Segregation Policy: No Specific Plan Endorsed To Prevent Mixed Schools, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 28, 1956; at 1 (reproducing a similar statement of
Southside Representative William Tuck); supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text
(noting political opposition to desegregation).
201. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 113-14; see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the "vociferous opposition" to desegregation).
202. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 29-30.
203. See id.
204. See id.
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Many ideas analyzed above illustrate the inherent limitations
that constrain essentially legal approaches to complex societal
issues. The Supreme Court's pronouncements, purporting to
declare the law of the land and to interpret the Constitution, no
matter how forcefully, elegantly, or morally phrased, were, in
the final analysis, merely legal statements. 205 Intrinsic restrictions limit what courts can accomplish .by only proclaiming
changes in the law without careful attention to efficacious implementation and corresponding modifications in p"olitical and
social attitudes. 206
The law and legal institutions may not be particularly effective agents of social change, especially implicating issues as
complicated · and co~troversial as race and integration. 207
Some of these inherent limitations, pragmatic realities involving the effectuation of Brown and of integration, and some
political and social practicalities coalesced to undermine the
promise of Brown's legal holding during the decade following
its enunciation. ~
·
Indeed, a few of the attorneys who pursued much of the highprofile school and other desegregation litigation and certain
individuals who participated in those suits and in activities,
such as sit-in demonstrations that were intended to promote
integration, recognized the limitations of the law and cases relatively soon after the Court's issuance of Brown. 209 For example,
Thurgood Marshall appreciated- that legal solutions and litigation victories might not foster long-term improvements in society, and this realization and frustration that litigation had become less central to advancing civil rights may even have led
him to resign as Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense
2 8

205. Other commentatOrs have examined the ideas above, particularly in the context of race and desegregation. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51-74 (1987); BICKEL, supra note 28, at 6872, 250-54; RoSENBERG, supra note 28, at 72-93; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW 152-53 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
206. See BICKEL, supra note 28, at 68-72, 250-54; WOODWARD, supra note 205, ·at
152-53.
207. See BELL, supra note 205, at 51-74.
208. See RoSENBERG, supra note 28, at 72-93.
209. See TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 268, 301-13 (focusing on Thurgood Marshall).
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Fund. 210 The contemporaneous statements of blacks who actively participated in endeavors aimed at desegregation are
concomitantly replete with allusions to the limited efficacy of
law, legal remedies, and litigation. 211

VII.

CONCLUSION

I have told one story of how the. Supreme Court's failure to
ensure that Brown's mandate received rigorous implementation,
in conjunction with Virginia state and local governmental
authorities' efforts to prevent public school integration, delayed
desegregation for a decade after Brown. This Essay has also examined the important consequences of not realizing Brown's
promise and the-way in which this failure happened. The analysis reveals that the Old Dominion's public schools experienced
little more integration than did those of North Carolina, even
though the Commonwealth couched its rhetoric in more defiant
terms and judges scrutinized Virginia's educational system more
closely. The Old Dominion did enjoy significantly less economic
prosperity than did North Carolina, and the Commonwealth arguably paid for its recalcitrance in terms of foregone financial
development. This piece affords a snapshot of the ten-year period subsequent to Brown in Virginia and Petersburg. Considerably more research analogous to the valuable work that Professor Douglas has performed remains to be undertaken on is1:1ues
involving race and public schools in other states and localities
during that time and the three decades since 1965.212

210. See id.
211. Contemporaneous newspaper accounts of the desegregation fight over the Petersburg Public Library included speeches by numerous blacks warning about these
inherent limitations. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 9, at 865-66.
212. Of course, some writers already have undertaken this work, and I have relied on
it in this Essay. See, e.g., DOUGI..AS, supra note 5. Numerous other writers treat these
issues broadly or examine specific states or localities briefly. See, e.g., Drew S. Days,
III, The Other Desegregation Story: Eradicating the Dual School System in Hillsborough
County, Florida, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1992); Klarman, supra note 5. It would be
valuable to have additional analyses that concentrate on specific states and localities.
Related developments in the North are beyond the scope of this piece; however, they
too deserve analysis. See, e.g., RoNALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE,
CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s (1991); GEORGE R. METCALF, FROM
LITTLE ROCK TO BOSTON: THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1983).

